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BY WILLIAM
MkLSTWNE
Professor of Law,
Duke University
THE PROBLEM OF
RCCONCILIIN1G
THE CONTRADICTORY
GOALS OF
EFFICIENlCY
EQUIT
IUMANITY
The HEW affirmative action guidelines for hiring
present a confused entanglement of "merit" princi-
ples with notions of personal deservingness and
efficiency. As a practical service, I would like to share
with you some ideas inspired by some of the most
interesting and provocative writings I have found on
the subject.
One of these is a piece by Boris Bittker on the case
of the Checkerboard Ordinance [71 YALE 1387
(1962)], and another is his more recent series of
lectures at Ohio State, published by Random House
as The Case for Black Reparation (1973). The third is
John Rawls' The Theory of Justice, a book to tax one's
feelings, and a fine application of Rawls to the issue of
compensatory discrimination appears in "Equal
Treatment and Compensatory Discrimination," by
philosopher Tom Nagel in the Journal of'Philosophy
and Public Afairs, 1973.
The following kind of case summarizes the current
intellectual controversy: a law faculty is debating
which of two individuals should fill a position. It
seems to be a close case and, as the discussion begins
to flounder, someone suggests that the faculty ought
to consider some quick options to resolve the
deadlock. One is simply to flip a coin so that the
chances are equal. A second is to press the discussion
to finer and finer points of qualification and to resolve
it by a kind of lame consensus. The third possibility is
to discover that one is male and the other female, or
that one is black and the other white.
It has been suggested that such facts would defy the
merit principle, but I have much difficulty with that
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position. I think that that nomenclature itself tends to
beg an extremely serious question.
EFFICIENCY, PROFICIENCY AND MERIT
What we use in academic hiring is an elficiency model
and a proficiency standard of appointment. The term
"merit," on the other hand, suggests that jobs are
being conferred partly as an award for deservingness:
that the person appointed more readily "deserves" the
post than the other individual.
Yet, in the admission of students, we do not ask
which has "worked harder," or who shows greater
"good will," or who has tended to "rise above greater
handicaps." We use an efficiency standard to
determine where we will get the greatest return for the
least educational input. This is exactly right when
one's concern is the reasonable management of scarce
educational resources; I do not mean to disparage it.
(Please turn the page)
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Two points thus seem quite plain. First, as a general
proposition, appointment to academic faculties is not
based on "merit" in its general ethical connotation of
personal deservingness. Rather, it is based on
determinations of "proficiency." Insofar as we
distinguish deservingness from proficiency, we
cannot simply deduce merit in the sense of
deservingness from proficiency per se-yet it is truly
the latter that more usually describes our standards.
Second, the use of a proficiency standard needs no
apology, for in any society of scarce resources, it is
equitable that we take care not to waste them.
Appointment by a proficiency standard is defensible
and proper.
But even where efficiency is the prime objective, it is
not uncommon for enterprises to shade efficiency
standards in the name of some concept of social or
personal justice. Suppose we have three people, two of
whom can produce rivets at the rate of 60 an hour, the
third at the rate of 58 an hour. Assume further that
the company will make profit by hiring anyone who
produces at least 55.
The question is whether you can justify a decision to
hire the person that produces only 58 an hour over
either of the other two who produce 60 an hour. My
answer is "yes." A conscientious, profit-making en-
terprise could readily justify hiring the person who is
somewhat marginally less productive than others. One
ground might be an individual decision based on
"personal deservingness." In the university system,
we generally avoid it because it seems to be
demeaning, patronizing and invidious to ask each
candidate to parade his personal worth and respond
to the question, "What hardships have they over-
come?"
But remember, after World War I, veterans were
given preference over all job applicants. A kind of
generic societal decision was made that the disadvan-
tage imposed by forced military service warranted
some degree of compensation, even at the hiring level.
It did not require the employer to give up a minimum
efficiency standard. We may disagree as to whether
veterans' preferences were a good thing, but the
disagreement does not rise to the level of a kind of
horrendous social cataclysm. The same sort of
question is involved here.
At a certain level, part of the HEW guidelines
already significantly depart from an efficiency model.
Most of us have had very few objections to the
pressure exerted by the guidelines that one be a little
inefficient in the areas of canvassing' and recruiting.
We only seem to get into problems at the level of
"one-to-one comparison" at the actual hiring level.
But on an efficiency model, a good defense may still
be made even of the much-maligned "old boy
method" of recruiting. That is, a few hurriedly placed
phone calls will generate enough names of well-
qualified people so that, by spending very little time
and money, a given department seems to staff itself
most efficiently.
To the extent that the HEW guidelines exert "over-
spending" pressures to generate two or three
additional names, it may not seem to be a very
economical use of funds. Nonetheless, we feel
generally at ease with this aspect of affirmative action.
I think we're at ease with it because we recognize some
sense of distributive justice that has to be taken into
account in the compensation for social disadvan-
tage-especially when the disadvantage has been sys-
tematically imposed. There have been very few
intellectual exceptions to this "preferential" portion
of the guidelines. It is a coerced subsidy of a
marginally inefficient character at the level of
canvassing and recruiting, linked to sex and race.
PROBLEMS AT THE ONE-TO-ONE LEVEL
Yet, it's only at the one-to-one level (who is to be
appointed) where something seems to change. The
"transfer payment" seems to be not from the larger
group whose tuitions, contributions or taxes will be
spent in this marginally inefficient way. Rather it
comes down to the actual decision to make the
appointment itself.
In attempting to close in on just how great the
difference in degree is, however, it may be helpful to
bear in mind the case with which we started-one in
which the difference in proficiency between the two
candidates is trivial and the faculty already agrees
that either applicant will constitute an educational
gain to the department. Notice how the system may
work in practice: subsidies in canvassing and recruit-
ment keyed to race and sex may expand the pool of
applicants, and tend to turn up applicants better
qualified than those who would appear without the
additional effort.
If the affirmative action plan does turn up a person
"better qualified" than others, suddenly we have no
further problem: the person is appointed forthwith.
Accordingly, another applicant (let us make him
white and male) would have secured the appointment
except for the sex-race forced subsidy to recruiting,
the result of which now takes him out on a pure
proficiency standard of appointment. Still, our sense
of justice is not nearly so much offended, and we have
no apology to make for the appointment standard
used.
Why, then, is there such a problem when a
university does not spend a great deal on expanded
recruiting and when a choice has to be made between
two potential appointees who are nearly equal in
proficiency but who are different in race or sex? (This
problem could arise even if more time and money have
been spent on expanded recruiting; the choice at the
hiring meeting might still be the same.)
We come to this problem partly by viewing the
hiring decision as the terminal decision. For instance,
if it is our view that one candidate is one percent (five
percent?) "better qualified," then that's really the full
dimension within which we will make comparison.
Even then, however, we have understated the problem
because of the reward system and the continuing
qualification system that necessarily and automatical-
ly ensues from this non-terminal decision of
appointment.
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You are not making just a terminal decision. You
are also making a training and preparation decision.
The person who's initially appointed because he was,
say, seven percent "more fit" by a job proficiency test
now receives an enhancement of salary and, indeed,
an in-service training opportunity by serving either as
a full-time instructor or assistant professor, enhanc-
ing his qualification at the next level of employment
by perhaps 25 percent. The person not appointed, and
having to seek a lower-skilled kind of job, now is
behind by 25 percentage points, so the "merit" de-
cision becomes even easier and more obvious at that
level.
If one is at all concerned with some sense of
distributive justice where the reward system is locked
in, and where the "hiring" decision is a non-terminal
"opportunity" decision, the issue of preferential
appointment becomes harder than first supposed. It
must be seen then that this nice arrangement, wherein
even the least difference of aptitude or proficiency
becomes an absolute cutoff for making the decision,
tends to magnify the difference to the next rung and,
therefore, to make the disparity even broader than it
was.
One of the concerns I have in this area is that if you
assume, as a purely hypothetical figure, a kind of
qualification disparity of maybe three percent
between men and women, then the consequence of
being merely an equal opportunity employer is not
just a perpetuated three percent disparity. Rather, the
disparity replicates itself in the next generation of job-
appointment decisions along still broader differences.
We start with tiny differences, but the decision is not
just to reward at that level, but also to enhance
eligibility for other possibilities. With this in mind, it
seems to me one can get hold of the problem in its
larger dimension and make a better case than has
been made.
In a basic way, all of this may indicate why some
special consideration is by no means unthinkable. A
commitment is made to marginally inefficient social
subsidies so as to close off the disparity, or at least to
keep it from widening even more. If you think it goes
too far, then I would put you back at the lower level
and ask you to state how you distinguish, for instance,
what seems to be a common accord with the
defensible inefficiency to subsidize additional training
efforts or schooling efforts at that level, without
recognizing that much of the same principle is
involved at the level of academic appointments as
well.
I have no firm conclusion to share from these
borrowed observations. I have meant only to suggest
some problems and difficulties to be recognized when
an appointment is made under the guidelines.
The issue is far more ambivalent, I fear, than much
of our intellectual pretension has been willing to
acknowledge. If I were understood to say that "merit"
is not relevant, then my remarks were even worse than
I had supposed them. Rather, I wanted to separate
the identification of personal deservingness with
regard to what is ordinarily a decision
of efficiency.
APPOINTMENT
TO ACADEMIC
FACULTIES
IS NOT
BASED ON
MERIT
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